Security
Security updates related to the Ethereum protocol, tooling infrastructure and applications.
July 8, 2024
Sec
by EPS Research Team
The Ethereum Protocol Security (EPS) Research Team is pleased to announce the launch of the first Ethereum protocol Attackathon, hosted by Immunefi. This four-week event aims to enhance the security of the Ethereum protocol through a large-scale crowdsourced security audit competition. Our goal is to raise over 2 million USD for the reward pool, the EF has seeded the pool with an initial 500,000 USD.
July 2, 2024
Sec
by EF Operational Security
On 2024-06-23, 00:19 AM UTC, a phishing email was sent out to 35,794 email addresses by updates@blog.ethereum.org with the following content Users who clicked the link in the email were sent to a malicious website: This website had a crypto drainer running in the background, and if a user initiated their wallet and signed the transaction requested by their website their wallet would have been drained. Our internal security team immediately launched an investigation to help determine who launched the attack, what the aim of the attack was, when it happened, who was affected, and how it happened. Some of the intial actions taken were: Prevented the threat actor from sending additional emails. Sent out notifications via twitter and email to not click the link in question. Closed down the
March 21, 2024
Sec
by Marius van der Wijden, Toni Wahrstätter, Parithosh Jayanthi
This blog post discloses a threat against the Ethereum network that was present from the Merge up until the Dencun hard fork.
May 18, 2021
Sec
by Martin Holst Swende & Peter Szilagyi
With this blog post, the intention is to officially disclose a severe threat against the Ethereum platform, which was a clear and present danger up until the Berlin hardfork.
November 12, 2020
Sec
January 15, 2019
Sec
by Hudson Jameson
The Ethereum Core Developers and the Ethereum Security Community were made aware of the potential Constantinople-related issues identified by ChainSecurity on January 15, 2019. We are investigating any potential vulnerabilities and will follow with updates in this blog post and across social media channels. Out of an abundance of caution, key stakeholders around the Ethereum community have determined that the best course of action will be to delay the planned Constantinople fork that would have occurred at block 7,080,000 on January 16, 2019. This will require anyone running a node (node operators, exchanges, miners, wallet services, etc...) to update to a new version of Geth or Parity before block 7,080,000. Block 7,080,000 will occur in approximately 32 hours from the time of this publishing or at approximately
December 15, 2017
Sec
by Everton Fraga
Due to a Chromium vulnerability affecting all released versions of the Mist Browser Beta v0.9.3 and below, we are issuing this alert warning users not to browse untrusted websites with Mist Browser Beta at this time. Users of "Ethereum Wallet" desktop app are not affected. Affected configurations: Mist Browser Beta v0.9.3 and below Likelihood: Medium Severity: High Malicious websites can potentially steal your private keys. As Ethereum Wallet desktop app does not qualify as a browser — it accesses only the local Wallet Dapp — it is not subject to the same category of issues present in Mist. For now, it is recommended to use Ethereum Wallet to manage funds and interact with smart contracts instead. Mist Browser's vision is to be a complete user-facing bridge to the ethereum blockchain
December 19, 2016
Sec
by Hudson Jameson
On December 16, we were made aware that someone had recently gained unauthorized access to a database from forum.ethereum.org. We immediately launched a thorough investigation to determine the origin, nature, and scope of this incident. Here is what we know: The information that was recently accessed is a database backup from April 2016 and contained information about 16.5k forum users. The leaked information includes Messages, both public and private IP-addresses Username and email addresses Profile information Hashed passwords ~13k bcrypt hashes (salted) ~1.5k Wordpress-hashes (salted) ~2k accounts without passwords (used federated login) The attacker self-disclosed that they are the same person/persons who recently hacked Bo Shen. The attacker used social engineering to gain access to a mobile phone number that allowed them